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Abstract - Wireless sensor networks (WSN) are usually deployed in hostile environments, which having 
a wide variety of malicious attacks. As various applications of WSN have been proposed, security has 
become one of the big research challenges dan is receiving increasing attention. In order to insure the 
security of communication in wireless sensor networks, we proposed a new ID-based signcryption 
scheme using bilinear pairing. Under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, the security of the 
scheme is proved under the Random Oracle Model. This scheme can be used by the sensor nodes that 
with low power, less storage space and low computation ability. It is concluded that the proposed 
lightweight scheme satisfies the security requirements of WSN.  
 
Index terms: WSN, ID-based signcryption, provably secure, bilinear pairing. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Wireless sensor network (WSN) is a new network structure which consists of small nodes also 
called motes.  These motes can be used to monitor physical or environmental conditions around 
them such as temperature, sound, vibration etc, process data, and communicate through wireless 
links [1]. In WSN, wireless sensors communicate each other by using of a radio link. WSNs are 
widely used these days and are very popular in research for use of embedded systems in our daily 
life. WSNs are used in applications involving monitoring, tracking, or controlling such as habitat 
monitoring, robotic toys, battlefield monitoring, packet insertion [2, 3], traffic monitoring, object 
tracking and nuclear reactor control. 
Usually, we protect message confidentiality by using encryption program, and use digital 
signature technology to prevent messages from being forged. Compared to the using of the above 
two techniques, Zheng [4] proposed the signcryption technology which is more applicable to 
resource-constrained networks. Signcryption scheme is a cryptographic primitive that provides 
both these properties together in an efficient way. Adi Shamir [5] introduced the concept of 
identity based cryptography. The idea of identity based cryptography is to enable a user to use 
any arbitrary string (such as name, Identity number, Email address, etc.) as his public key. 
Identity based cryptography serves as an efficient alternative to Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
based systems. ID-based signcryption was first studied by Malone-Lee et al. [6]. ID-based 
cryptography does not require public key authentication, it has a higher efficiency of computing 
and communications, and more suitable. Formally, some ID-based signcryption algorithms are 
designed for WSN security communications [7-12]. The results show that the ID-based 
signcryption technology plays an important role to improve the safety and efficiency of WSN. 
In order to further improve the safety and efficiency of the WSN communication, this paper 
designs a provably secure signcryption algorithm based on the Identity, the computation and 
transmission costs of the algorithm is small, which can better meet the needs of the WSN  that 
having fixed topology, distributed management, and resource-constrained environment. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some definitions and security 
modes. Our proposed scheme is described in Section 3. The security of our scheme is analyzed in 
Section 4. Section 5 gives the conclusion. 




In this section, we review some background knowledge including the bilinear pairing and Diffie-
Hellman problem. We also provide the generic mode and security notions necessary to build our 
signcryption scheme in this section. We refer the reader to [13-15] for a discussion of how to build 
a concrete instance using supersingular curves and compute the bilinear map. 
 
a. Bilinear pairings and Diffie-Hellman problem  
We briefly review the bilinear pairing. Let G1 denote an additive group of prime order p and G2 be 
a multiplicative group of the same prime order. Let ê: G1×G1→G2 be a bilinear mapping with the 
following properties: 
(1) Bilinear: ê(aP, bQ) =  ê(P, Q)
ab
, for all P, Q∈G1, and a, b
*
qZ . 
(2) Non-degenerate: ê(Q, R) ≠ 1, for some Q, R∈G1. 
(3) Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute ê(P, Q) for any P, Q G1.  
The security of our scheme relies on the hardness of the following problems. 
Definition 1. Let (G1, +) be a cyclic additive group generated by P, the computational Diffie-
Hellman (CDH) problem in G1 is to compute abP given aP, bP. 
Definition 2. Given two groups G1 and G2 of the same prime order p, a bilinear mapping ê: 
G1×G1→G2 and a generator P of G1, the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman (CBDH) problem 
in (G1, G2, ê) is to compute ê(P, P)
abc
, given (P, aP, bP, cP). 
 
b. Outline of ID-based signcryption  
An ID-based signcryption scheme consists of the following four probabilistic polynomial time 
(PPT) algorithms: 
Setup: Given a security parameter 1
Қ
, private key generator (PKG) uses this algorithm to 
generate Params the global public parameters and master secret key S and a corresponding public 
key Ppub. 
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Extract: Given an identity ID, the PKG computes the corresponding private key KID and 
transmits it to its owner in a secure way. 
Signcrypt: To send a message m to Bob, Alice obtains the ciphertext σ by computing 
Signcrypt(m, KAlice, IDBob). 
Unsigncrypt: When Bob receives σ, he computes Unsigncrypt(σ, IDAlice, KBob) and obtains the 
plaintext m or value “invalid” if σ is an invalid ciphertext between identities IDAlice and IDBob. 
 
c. Security notions 
Malone-Lee [3] defined the security notions for ID-based signcryption schemes. These notions 
are indistinguishability of ID-based signcryption against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks and 
unforgeability of ID-based signcryption against adaptive chosen messages attacks. 
Definition 3: An ID-based signcryption scheme is said to be indistinguishable against adaptive 
chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-IDSC-CCA2) if no polynomially bounded adversary has non-
negligible advantage in the following game: 
Setup: The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm with a security parameter 1
Қ 
and obtains public 
parameters Params and the master private key S. C sends Params to the adversary A and keeps S 
secret. 
Phase I: The adversary A performs a polynomially bounded number of queries to C. The queries 
made by A may be adaptive, i.e. current query may depend on the answers to the previous queries. 
The various oracles and the queries made to these oracles are defined below: 
(1) Key extraction queries: A produces an identity IDi and receives the private key Ki.  
(2) Signcryption queries: A produces two identities IDi, IDj and a plaintext m. C computes Ki and 
generates the signcryption σ of the message m using Ki following the signcryption scheme and 
sends σ to A. 
(3) Unsigncryption queries: A produces the sender identity IDi, the receiver identity IDj and the 
signcryption σ as input to this algorithm and requests the unsigncryption of σ. C generates the 
private key Kj and performs the unsigncryption of σ using Kj and sends the result to A. The result 
of unsigncryption will be “invalid” if σ is not a valid signcryption. It returns the message m if σ is 
a valid signcryption. 
Challenge: A chooses two plaintexts, m0 and m1 of equal length, the sender identity IDi, the 
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receiver identity IDj and submits them to C. However, A should not have queried the private key 
corresponding to IDi in Phase I. C now chooses b }1,0{  and computes σ = Signcrypt(mb, Ki, IDj) 
and sends σ to A. 
Phase II: A is allowed to interact with C as in Phase-I with the following restrictions.  A should 
not query the extract oracle for the private key corresponding to the receiver identity IDj. A 
should not query the unsigncrypt oracle with (σ, IDi, IDj) as input, i.e. a query of the form 
Unsigncrypt(σ, IDi, IDj) is not allowed. 
Guess: Finally, A produces a bit b’ and wins the game if b’ = b.  The advantage of A in the above 
game is defined by Adv(A) = |2Pr(b’ = b) - 1|, where Pr(b’ = b) denotes the probability that b’ = 
b. 
Note that the adversary is allowed to make a key extraction query on identity IDi in the above 
definition. This condition corresponds to the stringent requirement of the insider security for 
confidentiality of signcryption. It also ensures the forward security of the scheme. 
Definition 4: An ID-based signcryption scheme is said to be existentially unforgeable against 
adaptive chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA) if no polynomially bounded adversary has a non-
negligible advantage in the following game. 
Setup: The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm with security parameter 1
Қ 
and obtains public 
parameters Params and the master private key S. C sends Params to the adversary A and keeps S 
secret. 
Training Phase: The adversary A performs a polynomially bounded number of queries 
adaptively as in Phase I of confidentiality game (IND-IDSC-CCA2). 
Forgery: After a sufficient amount of training, A produces a signcryption (σ, IDi, IDj) to C. Here, 
A should not have queried the private key of IDi during the training phase and σ is not the output 
of Signcrypt(m, IDi, IDj) as input (m=Unsigncrypt(σ, IDi, IDj) ). A wins the game, if 
Unsigncrypt(σ, IDi, IDj) is valid. 
The advantage of A is defined as the probability that it wins. Note that the adversary is allowed to 
make a key extraction query on the identity IDj in the above definition. This condition is 
considered to the stringent requirement of insider security for signcryption. 
 
III. ID-BASED SIGNCRYPTION SCHEME FOR WSN 
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In this section, we propose a new ID-based signcryption which can be efficient used in WSN. 
The following shows the details of our scheme. 
 Setup: Define G1, G2 and ê as in previous section. Let H1, H2 and H3 be three cryptographic hash 











. Let P be a generator of G1. PKG chooses a master secret key 
*
qR ZS , keeps S secret and 
computes Ppub = SP. The system’s public parameters Params are (G1, G2, q, n, P, Ppub, ê, H1, H2, 
H3, H4). 
Extract: Given Params, to generate a secret key for a user with identity ID nR }1,0{ , PKG 
computes KID = SQID, where QID = H1(ID). 
Signcrypt: To send a message m to user B with identity IDB, user A with identity IDA follows the 
steps below. 
(1) Choose *qR Zx . 
(2) Compute U = xP. 
(3) Compute α = ê(P2, QB)
x
. 
(4) Compute β = H2(m, α, U). 
(5) Compute C = m β. 
(6) Compute r = H3(C, U, β). 
(7) Compute V = xPpub + rKA 
The ciphertext is σ = (c, U, V). 
Unsigncrypt: When receiving σ = (c, U, V), user B follows the steps below. 
(1) Compute α = ê(U, KB). 
(2) Compute β = H2(m, α, U). 
(3) Recover m = C β. 
(4) Compute r = H3(C, U, β). 
(5) Accept the message if and only if the equation holds, ê(P, V) = ê(U, Ppub)ê(Ppub, QA)
r
. 
Otherwise, output “Invalid”. 
 
IV.  SECURITY ANALYSIS 
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a. Correctness  
The correctness can be easily verified by the following equations. 
ê(P, V) = ê(P, xPpub + rKA)  = ê(xP, Ppub)ê(P, rKA) = ê(U, Ppub) ê(P, rSQA) 
                            = ê(U, Ppub) ê(SP, QA)
r




b. Security  
Theorem 1 (Confidentiality). If their exists an adversary called A that is able to break the IND-
IDSC-CCA2 security with an advantage ε, then there exists a distinguisher C that can solve the 
CBDH problem with advantage O(ε). 
Proof. The interaction between A and C can be viewed as a game given in definition 3. Assume 
the distinguisher C is provided with a random instance (P, aP, bP, cP) of the CBDH problem. 
His goal is to compute ê(P, P)
abc
. C will run A as a subroutine and act as A’s challenger in the 
IND-IDSC-CCA2 game. During the game, A will consult C for answers to the random oracles H1, 
H2 and H3. C maintains lists L1, L2, L3 respectively in giving the responses to the queries. These 
answers are randomly generated, but to maintain the consistency and to avoid collision.  
Setup: For having the game with A, C chooses Ppub = aP and gives A the system parameters (G1, 
G2, q, P, Ppub). Note that a is unknown to C, this value simulates the master secret key value for 
the PKG in the game. 
Phase I: During phase I, A is allowed to access the various oracles provided by C. A can get 
sufficient training before generating the forgery. The various oracles provided by C to A during 
training are as follows. 
• H1 Oracle Queries (ΩH1): When this oracle is queried with IDi by A, C responds as follows. C 
chooses a random number i0 {1, 2, . . ., qH1}, where qH1 is the maximum bounded number of 
allowed queries by A. At the i0-th query, C answers by H1 (IDi0) = bP, stores (IDi,  , bP) in list L1. 
Otherwise, sets Qi = H1(IDi) = biP, stores (IDi, bi, Qi) in list L1. C returns Qi to A. 
• H2 Oracle Queries (ΩH2): When A makes a query with input (mi, αi, Ui), C performs the 
following. If (mi, αi, Ui, βi) is available in list L2, C returns βi to A. Otherwise, C picks 
*
qR Z  
satisfying no vector (·, ·, ·, β) exists in L2, stores (mi, αi, Ui, β) in list L2. Then, C returns β to A. 
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• H3 Oracle Queries (ΩH3):  On a (Ci, Ui, βi) query, C checks whether there exists (Ci, Ui, βi, ri) 
in L3 or not. If such a tuple is found, C answers ri, otherwise he chooses 
*
qR Zr  , returns it as an 
answer to the query and puts the tuple (Ci, Ui, βi, r) into L3. 
Key extraction queries: When A asks the secret key of user with identity IDi, if i = i0, then C 
fails and stops. Else, C computes Qi  = ΩH1(IDi), Ki = aQi = biPpub. If (IDi, ·, Qi) does not exists in 
the list L1, C stores it in L1. Then C returns Ki to A. 
Signcryption queries: A queries a signcryption for a plaintext m and identities IDi and IDj. C has 
the following two cases to consider. Case1: i ≠ i0. C computes the private key Si corresponding to 
IDi by running the key extraction query algorithm. Then C answers the query by a call to 
Signcrypt(m, Si, Qj). Case 2: i = i0. C chooses r,
*
qZx  and computes U = xP - rQi; α = ê(U, Kj); 
V = xP1 (here, Kj is derived from the key extraction algorithm). C runs the H2 simulation 
algorithm to find β = ΩH2 (m, α, U); C = Eα(m||β). C then checks if L3 already contains a tuple (C, 
U, β, r’) with r ≠ r’. In this case, C repeats the process with another random pair (x, r) until 
finding a tuple (m, U, k, r) whose first three elements do not appear in a tuple of the list L3. When 
an appropriate pair (x, r) is found, the ciphertext (c, U, V) appears to be valid from A’s viewpoint. 
Unsigncryption queries: For an unsigncryption query, C has the following two cases to consider. 
Case 1: j = i0. C always answers “invalid” to A. Case 2: j ≠ i0. C derives Kj from the key 
extraction algorithm, then C computes α = ê(U, Kj); β = ΩH2 (m, α, U); m = C β; r = ΩH3 (C, U, 
β). C checks if ê(P, V) = ê(U, P1)ê(P, QA)
r 
holds. If the equation does not hold, C rejects the 
ciphertext. Otherwise C returns m to A. 
Challenge Phase: At the end of Phase I interaction, A picks two messages (m0, m1) of equal 
length, the sender identity IDS and the receiver identity IDR, and submits to C. On getting this, C 
checks whether R = i0. If R ≠ i0, then we have the conclusion that C aborts. Otherwise, C chooses 
a random bit t }1,0{  and generates the signcryption value of m as follows. C picks a random 
*
qR Zx , sets U* = aP, computes β* = ΩH2(mt, x, U*); C* = m β* ; r* = ΩH3(C*, U*, β*); V = 
daP + r*ΩExtract(IDi). C returns σ* = (U*, V*, C*) as the challenge signcryption to A. 
Phase-II: A interacts with C as in Phase-I, but with the following restrictions that A should not 
query the private key of IDR and the unsigncryption of σ* with IDS as sender and IDR. At the end 
of the interaction, A produces a bit t’ for which he believes the relation σ* = Signcrypt(mt’, KS, 
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IDR) holds. At this moment, if t = t’, C outputs h = ê(U*, Ki0) = ê(aP, cbP) = ê(P, P)
abc
 as a 
solution of the CBDH problem, otherwise C stops and outputs “failure”. 
Probability Analysis: The probability of success of C can be measured by analyzing the various 
events that happen during the simulation. Assume qH1, qH2, qH3, qK, qS, qU are the maximum 
polynomial number of queries allowed to the oracles ΩH1, ΩH2, ΩH3, ΩH1, key extraction queries, 
signcryption queries and unsigncryption queries, respectively. The events in which C aborts the 
IND-IBSC-CCA2 game are list as follows. If A asked a key extraction query on IDi0 during the 
first stage, C fails. The probability for C not to fail in this event is 
11
)( HKH qqq . Further, with a 
probability )(1
1 KH
qq , A chooses to be challenged using  the receiver with identity IDi0. Hence 
the probability that A’s response is helpful to C is 
1
1 Hq . 
Taking into account all the probabilities that C will not fail its simulation, the value of Adv(C) is 



























If the advantage ε of A to break the IND-IDSCMP-CCA2 game non-negligible, the probability of 
C to solve CBDH problem is also non-negligible. 
Theorem 2 (Unforgeability). If their exists an adversary called A that is able to break the EUF-
CMA security with an advantage ε, then there exists a distinguisher C that can solve the CDH 
problem with advantage O(ε). 
Proof. The interaction between A and C can be viewed as a game given in definition 4. When C 
is provided with a random instance (P, aP, bP) of the CDH problem. C can use A as a subroutine 
and act as A’s challenger in the EUF-CMA game to compute abP. During the game, A will 
consult C for answers to the random oracles H1, H2 and H3. C maintains lists L1, L2, L3 
respectively in giving the responses to the queries. These answers are randomly generated, but to 
maintain the consistency and to avoid collision. 
Setup: For having the game with A, C chooses Ppub = aP and gives A the system parameters (G1, 
G2, q, P, Ppub). Note that a is unknown to C, this value simulates the master secret key value for 
the PKG in the game. 
Training Phase: During this phase, A is allowed to access the various oracles provided by C. A 
can get sufficient training before generating the forgery. The various oracles provided by C to A 
during training are similar to the oracles described in phase I of Theorem 1. 
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Forgery Phase: After getting sufficient training, A submits the signcryption (IDi, IDj, σ) with the 
following restrictions that A has not ever queried the private key of IDi and the unsigncryption of 
σ*. If i = i0 and σ is valid, C does the following. C retrieves r correspondingly from list L3, 
computes the value abP = Ki = r
-1
(V - xP1), i.e., C obtains the solution to the CDH problem 
instance. 
Probability Analysis: The probability of success of C can be measured by analyzing the various 
events that happen during the simulation. Assume  qH1, qH2, qH3, qK, qS, qU are the maximum 
polynomial number of queries allowed to the oracles ΩH1, ΩH2, ΩH3, ΩH1, key extraction queries, 
signcryption queries and unsigncryption queries, respectively. The events in which C aborts the 
EUF-CMA game are list as follows. If A asked a key extraction query on IDi0 during the first 
stage, C fails. The probability for C not to fail in this event is 
11
)( HKH qqq . Further, with a 
probability exactly )(1
1 KH
qq , A chooses to be challenged using  the receiver with identity IDi0. 
Hence the probability that A’s response is helpful to C is 
1
1 Hq . We have the conclusion that if A 
can win the EUF-CMA game with an advantage ε, the value of Adv(C) is calculated as Adv(C) =
1H
q . Then, if the advantage ε of A to break the EUF-CMA game is non-negligible, the 




In this paper, we have proposed a new ID-based signcryption scheme based on the bilinear 
pairings. Confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation and authentication are the important 
requirements for many cryptographic applications. We discussed the security of the newly 
proposed scheme in the random oracle model in detail. The results are that our scheme satisfies the 
confidentiality, the unforgeability, and the public verfiability. Thus, we have the conclusion that 
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